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This report outlines an approach for quantitative operations analysis of aspects of Fleet 
Battle Experiments (FBEs) using the methodology underlying the Battlespace Information 
War (BAT/IW) analytical tool. Key features of this approach are the following: 
(1) Ouick model set-up. 
(2) Very fast computer execution 
(3) High-level insights. 
Approach 
The general approach of this analysis methodology is to focus on a specific experimental 
initiative fiom one or more FBEs, such as Time Critical Targeting (TCT). Battlespace 
Information War (BAT/IW) models are then tailored to the experimental situation using 
actual data obtained fiom one or more experiments, incorporating the experiment systems 
architecture. After the models and actual data are reconciled, further analysis tasks are 
undertaken. 
Obi ectives 
The objectives of operational, model-based analysis of FBE, and other data are several. 
(a) To supply planners and analysts with quick-tumaround, high-level (although low 
resolution) information on actual and prospective FBE outcomes. 
(b) To evaluate Measures of Operational Effectiveness (summary guides to 
understanding). 
(c) To evaluate the projected effect of new Blue (and also Red) capability (added 
bandwidth = communication speed = lower/reduced lateness, and/or new sensor 
configurations and capabilities, and/or new weapons, and faster, differently managed 
but possibly vulnerable communication links on Blue force effectiveness (weapons on 
target vs. weapons expended). 
(d) To evaluate the projected effect of revised CONOPS by both sides, with attention to 
risk and crisis control. 
Analvsis Tool: The Battlespace Information War Model (BATIIW) 
There are at least two aspects of warfare that are addressed using relatively simple tools 
in BAT/IW. 
(a) BAT/IW modeling helps analyze and understand the system-level impact of sensor 
data quality, including timeliness, as one contributor to total operatiodcampaign 
success. 
(b) BAT/TW modeling accounts for the latency involved in processing information, 
including communications delays, decision time, waiting, etc. Such latency can 
strongly, and negatively, influence success of Time-Critical Targeting. 
Example: Analysis of FBE Foxtrot Data Using BAT/IW 
An example shows how operational data obtained during FBE Foxtrot can be 
quantitatively analyzed. The BAT/IW modeling concepts can be utilized to explore other 
alternatives: different patterns of Red threats (e.g. more time-concentrated or surge-like, 
extensive use of decoys, various air defense CONOPS), and different Blue force sizes and 
types. Note: these additional steps are not carried out here, but will be the topics of future 
work. In FBE Foxtrot, data collected arises from time critical targets (TCTs) that are 
nominated to the LAWS (Land Attack Weapon System). Nominated target images are 
simultaneously sent to JTW (Joint Targeting Workstation). At the JTW stage an operator 
(currently human) processes the images: those images are classified and mensurated, i.e. 
given geographical coordinates (which of course are subject to error, which ultimately 
degrades weapon effectiveness). When this step is complete, the potential target images 
become the responsibility of LAWS to assign to weapons, and possibly to specific platforms. 
The stages before nomination and after LAWS assignment are not analyzed in this example, 
since data were not available. 
... 
1ll 
During EBE Foxtrot, there were 176 TCTs nominated, of which 93 were fired upon. 
Thus, 83 of the targets were not fired upon. Of these 83 targets, 47 were not fired upon due to 
deficiency of time, target information, or resources. The remaining 36 targets were not fired 
upon for other causes. 
In order to analyze available data we model the entire LAWS and JTW (sub) system (here 
called a central processing (CP) system, actually, a part of such a system) as a single-server 
queuing process with losses (caused by targets that move or hide, or otherwise foster inability 
to mensurate, hence qualify a target). The “single server” delay is assumed dominated by 
human operators: those who provide mensuration, and the LAWS-shooter weapons 
assignment delay. Communications delays are implicitly included. The presently available 
data provide no information that allows separation of stages (mensuration and firer 
classification, and weapons-target pairing). 
We consider three models for the CP delays, with mean times estimated fi-om EBE 
Foxtrot data, that incorporate the information that of the 83 targets that were not fired upon, 
36 targets were not fired upon for causes other than deficiency of time, etc. A question that 
the analysis showed to be important is: when were those 36 targets discovered, and when 
were they eliminated? The three models account for different possibilities. 
An interesting insight obtained fi-om the analysis of this example is recognition of the 
effect that the presence of the 36 targets which were not fired upon because of reasons other 
than deficiency in time, etc. can have on the performance of the CP system. The results show 
that the amount of CP resources that these 36 targets consume has a large effect on the ability 
to fire missions against time critical targets. The fkaction of targets for which a firing 
command is given is largest for Model III in which the targets are identified almost as soon 
as they are nominated as not being targetable. This is an ideal, optimistic special case, but is 
quantified for illustration of the best that can be done. The other cases are more realistic, but 
teach the same lesson. It is clearly important for the CP to identify these targets as early as 




This report outlines an approach for quantitative operations analysis of aspects of Fleet 
Battle Experiments (FBEs) using the methodology underlying the Battlespace Information 
War (BAT/IW) analytical tool; see Gaver and Jacobs (2000). Key features of this approach 
are the following: 
(1) Ouick model set-up. Once an FBE situation or systems architecture is described, 
models can be tailored for BAT/IW analysis very quickly. Initial modeling might take 
a few hours, followed by a few hours to enter the model on a computer, followed by a 
few hours to verify that the model is performing as intended. The total elapsed time to 
set up a new situation is typically no more than a few days. Variation of basic 
parameters, such as target arrival rates and patterns, takes minutes to hours. 
(2) Very fast computer execution. BAT/IW models are built with systems of 
mathematical equations that can be solved very quickly in a computer. On a typical 
desktop PC, runs of BAT/IW expected value models put graphical results on the 
computer screen in milliseconds. This very fast execution is particularly well suited 
for "what-if' analysis by operators as well as analysts. 
(3) Hi&-level insihts. BAT/IW modeling seeks to provide a basis for high-level insights 
through low-resolution models. BAT/IW looks at overall trends in the battlespace 
rather than focusing on individual unit interactions. It is also possible to plug system- 
level performance data obtained fkom high-resolution models into BAT/IW for 
subsequent analysis at the operational level. 
The following paragraphs in this section summarize the general approach and objectives 
of this work. Section 2 further describes BAT/IW. An introductory example, using data from 
FBE Foxtrot, appears in Section 3. 
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Approach 
The general approach of this analysis methodology is to focus on a specific experimental 
initiative fiom one or more FBEs, such as Time Critical Targeting (TCT). Battlespace 
Information War (BAT/IW) models are then tailored to the experimental situation using 
actual data obtained fi-om one or more experiments and the experiment systems architecture. 
After the models and actual data are reconciled, further analysis tasks are undertaken. For 
instance,$rst, the models and data are exercised to extract greater understanding about what 
was observed. Second, ‘%hat-if’ analysis is performed to expand the experimental results to a 
wider range o f  parameter inputs, e.g. by increasing the numbers of enemy (Red) candidate 
targets, or speeding up (or slowing down) target processing. Z’hird, insights are sought which 
suggest development of particular tactics, techniques, or procedures, andlor specific needs for 
further live experimentation and operational data collection during subsequent FBEs. 
Fourth, exploratory analysis is conducted of prospective architectures that might involve 
spatially dense sensor systems and a “flat” information--weapon-target-pairing--targeting 
system. 
Obi ectives 
The objectives of operational, model-based analysis of FBE, and other data are several. 
(a) To supply planners and analysts with quick-turnaround, high-level (although low 
resolution) information on actual and prospective FBE outcomes: data explanation and @ 
military-operational significance, by consideration o f  basic mechanisms of operational data 
creation and flow. The accuracy of  such depends on an adequate model representation of the 
data obtainable during an FBE. A difficulty is that observational data obtained fiorn at least 
some FBEs is of unknown completeness and quality. The BAT/IW analytical methodology 
can supply sensitivity tests of alternative interpretations ofpartially observed and reported 
operational data. 
(b) To evaluate Measures of Operational Effectiveness (summary guides to 
understanding). The capability to answer such what-if information as 
2 
The effect on operational data flow, (message traffic, e.g. numbers of potential 
Red targets engaged, and Blue (own) response capability) of increasing (e.g. 
doubling) and time-concentrating enemy forces. 
The projected effect of various forms of enemy deception, as by use of decoys. 
Such hformation War (Iw) issues have been stressed in BAT/IW; see Gaver and 
Jacobs (2000). 
. 
bandwidth = communication speed = lowerheduced lateness), andor new sensor 
configurations and capabilities, andor new weapons, and faster, differently managed but 
(c) To evaluate the projected effect of new Blue (and also Red) capability (added 
possibly vulnerable communication links on Blue force effectiveness (weapons on target vs. 
weapons expended). Eventually, Blue platform loss rate. 
(d) To evaluate the projected effect of revised CONOPS by both sides, with attention to 
risk and crisis control. 
2. ANALYSIS TOOL: THE BATTLESPACE INFORMATION WAR 
MODEL (BATDW) AND ITS EMPHASIS 
There are at least two aspects of warfare that are addressed, initially using relatively 
simple tools (but not necessarily always or forever), in BAT/IW. 
(a) Sensor and other (HUMINT, SIGINT, ELINT.. .) data collected on enemy force levels 
and types, maneuver and behavior, etc., are subject to detection delay and classification 
error. This classification error emphatically includes that of BDA. 
BATmmodeling helps analyze and understand the system-level impact of 
sensor data quality, including timeliness, as one important contributor to total 
operatiodcampaign success. Tradeoff analyses can be conducted of interlinked 
interactive system components, such as Information Acquisition, 
Communications, Weapons-Target Pairing, and BDA. 
3 i 
(b) Under current architectures (referred to here as Central Processor (CP)), “sensor” 
data passes to, and through (if track is not lost), a sequence of subprocessors that prepare it 
for assignment to weapons systems, and even to specific platfonns. The choice of appropriate 
weapons systems is subject to target classification error, a topic treated in Gaver and Jacobs 
(2000). 
%AT/IW modeling accounts for the latency involved in these stage($; latency of 
response to Time-Critical Targets seriously degrades or vitiates (and cumulatively 
and “nonlinearly” so) that response: a response that has been too slow, or mis- 
allocated, will have occupied CP attention needlessly, and thus handicapped 
response to subsequent target candidates. The effect tends to pyamid, allowing 
opportunity to Red. BAT/IW analysis can evaluate the capability of a given Blue 
CP architecture and CONOPS to respond to various Red threats. Some of this 
latency could be the result of unfavorable “swge” patterns of enemy (Red) 
activities. Such effects can be, and have been, portrayed using BAT/IW 
techniques. 
3. EXAMPLE: ANALYSIS OF FBE FOXTROT DATA USING BAT/IW 
We show how operational data obtained during FBE Foxtrot can be quantitatively 
analyzed. The BAT/IW model can be utilized to explore alternatives: different patterns of 
Red threats (e.g. more time-concentrated, extensive use of decoys, adoption of evasion and 
mobility techniques, various air defense CONOPS), and different Blue force sizes and types. 
(a) Data 
Appendix B of Gallup et al. (2000), (referred to as (Gt-) in what follows), presents data 
that arises fiom targets that are nominated to the LAWS (Land Attack Weapon System). 
Nominated target images are simultaneously sent to JTW (Joint Targeting Workstation). At 
the JTW stage an operator (currently human) processes the images: those images are 
classified and mensurated, i.e. given geographical coordinates (of course these are subject to 
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error, which ultimately degrades weapon effectiveness). When this step is complete, the 
potential target images become the responsibility of LAWS to assign to weapons, and to 
specific platforms. The stages before nomination and after LAWS assignment are not 
analyzed in the current example; appropriate data were unavailable. 
(b) Data and Model 
Appendix B of G+ presents data for the time fiom receipt of target nomination at LAWS 
(land attack weapon system) until firing at Red time-critical targets (TCT). There were 176 
Red TCTs nominated, of which 93 were fired upon. Thus, 83 of the targets were not fired 
upon. Of these 83 targets, 47 were not fired upon due to deficiency of time, target 
information, or resources. The remaining 36 targets were not fired upon for other causes; see 
G+, pages 84-85 for description. We have initially assumed that these 176 targets arrived 
“uniformly at random” during 12-hour periods on 4 days, 12/5 through 12/8. Thus 
provisionally, the constant arrival rate is taken to be 
A = 176/(12*4) = 3.67 target nominations per hour. 
Ifdesired, this can be allowed to define the mean of a stochastic arrival process, for instance 
Poisson. The present model is a “fluid approximation” to classical elementary queuing 
models. It is more general in that arrival rate, A, can easily be made a function of time, A(t). 
Figure 2 of Appendix B in G+ presents a histogram of the variable times from receipt of 
the target nomination at the LAWS server until weapon firing for those 61 targets for which 
this information could be obtained. In many cases the time at which the command “Fire 
When Ready” (FWR) was transmitted to the firer has been adopted as the firing time because 
of missing data; G+, p86. We will use time intervals in this histogram to represent the time 
from target nomination until the command FWR for the targets’ total time in a central 
processor. Table 3 of G+ reports the median time of data in this histogram as 33 min. We 
consequently assume a median target time in the central processor of 0.55 = 33/60 hours; this 
time includes both waiting time and service time. If one assumes an exponential distribution 
for this time, supported in steady-state by heavy traffic queuing theory, the median 
5 
corresponds to the mean time between target (image) nomination until the command FWR of 
W= OSYln(2) = 0.79 hours. This mean delay time, W, is taken asJixed during what follows. 
In order to analyze available data we model the entire LAWS and JTW (sub) system (here 
called a central processing (CP) system, actually a part of such a system) as a single-server 
queuing process with losses (caused by targets that move or hide, or otherwise foster inability 
to mensurate, hence qualify a target). The “single server” delay is assumed dominated by 
human operators: those who provide mensuration, and the LAWS-shooter weapons 
assignment delay. Communications delays are implicitly included. The presently available 
data provide no information that allows separation of stages (mensuration and firer 
classification, and weapons-target pairing). 
We must utilize the semi-stochastic BATW-style model to “read back” or infer the 
mean service time of the saturable, or increasingly lossy CP service system in the presence of 
increasing target candidate loads: each potential target is assumed subject to a loss rate, 
denoted v, where the mean time “in queue” until loss is llv. In practice, for present FBE 
Foxtrot the mean loss time is on the order of hours (2-4 perhaps). Note that there are other 
would-be targets that appear to transit (and load up) the CP stage but are finally evicted at the 
FWR stage. 
A further set of data is the number of targets that enter the CP that were actually targeted 
during FBE F. Using our model@), we can match those data (averages thereof) by choice of 
the service rate parameter, ,UE = l/mE, having assumed an approximate loss rate, v (e.g. 1 
hour). 
We consider 3 models for the CP delays, with mean estimatedfi-om FBE F data, that 
incorporate the information that, of the 83 targets that were not fired upon, 36 targets were 
not fired upon for causes other than deficiency of time, etc. The question is: when were they 
discovered and eliminated? We do models under differing circumstances. 
6 
Model I: we assume that there is one loss rate that includes loss due to all causes. In 
Model I these 36 targets are lost before the stage at which the command FWR is given. Thus 
in Model I we assume that 93 commands to FWR are given. 
Model 11: we assume that the 36 targets not fired upon for other causes are not subject to 
loss and they are in the system until the point at which a command to FWR could have been 
given. Thus in Model 11 we will assume that 93+36=129 commands to FWR could have been 
given, a fraction of which are not given the command. 
Model 111: we assume that the 36 targets are identified when they are nominated as not 
being available for targeting at the end of the CP stage. Thus, in Model III there are 176-36 
targets nominated which we will assume arrive at a constant rate over a 48-hour period at 
arrival rate 2.91 nominations per hour. In Model JII we assume 93 commands to FWR are 
given. This is clearly the most optimistically biased assumption. 
In Appendix A, a BAT/IW-style fluid model of the number of targets waiting or being 
served in a CP server with target losses is presented; the central processor here is LAWS and 
the JTW (Joint Targeting Workstation). The parameters of the model are the (possibly time 
dependent, but here assumed constant) arrival rate of target nominations to LAWS, the mean 
target loss time, denoted llv, and the mean servicelactual CP information processing time 
(mensuration, LAWS weapons assignment decisions, etc., until the command FWR is 
capable of being given) of a target once it has been nominated. Also presented is a 
differential equation for the time that a new target spends in the designated CP. The steady- 
state equatiqn for the mean time a target spends in the central processor yields an equation for 
the mean target service time as a function of mean target loss time for a specified mean time 
between target nomination and the possible command to FWR. 
Figure 1 displays the mean target service time versus the mean target loss time 
corresponding to a given mean time between target nomination and the command FWR of 
0.79 hours for arrival rate A = 3.67. The figure shows that the mean service time can be quite 
7 
sensitive to the mean target loss time, given that the mean delay time, W= 0.79. This figure 
depends upon “knowing” rate A. 
Arrival rate of tgts=3.67/hour 
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mean tgt loss time 
Figure 1 
In words, the same estimated mean delay time W =  0.79, which is here based on FBE 
Foxtrot data, can be achieved by, e.g. (1) a mean service time of l /p  = 0.6 hour and a mean 
loss time of l /v= 1 hour OY (2) a mean service time of l / p  = 0.35 hour and a mean loss time 
of l / v z  2 hours; further combinations consistent with the curve are possible. However, the 
former case (1) allows many more targets to be lost than does the latter (2). Another observed 
summary allows specification of l / p  and Vvparameters for the present data set. 
Figure 2 displays the mean number of commands to FWR issued during the 12*4 = 48 
hour period obtained fiom solving the fluid model using the parameters: anival rate 
3.67/hour, and mean target loss times (llv) and mean service times (Up) found in Figure 1 
(using mean time fiom target nomination to command to FWR equal to W= 0.79 hours). 
8 
The results displayed in Figure 2 show that the rate at which the command “fire when 
ready” can be transmitted is, as anticipated, very sensitive to the mean target loss time. 
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Figure 2 
(c) Model1 
In Model I the command FWR is assumed given for 93 targets out of the 176 targets 
nominated (see G+, p. 84). The fluid model shows that if the mean time between target 
nomination and the command FWR is W =  0.79 hours and 93 commands were given in the 48 
hour period, then the mean target loss time, (l/v), is about 1.7 hours and the mean service 
time by the central processor (LAWS and JTW) is about 0.38 hours = 23 minutes, “on the 
average”. This figure is at least roughly order-of-magnitude consistent with informed 
intuition. It can be used for further situational exploration and anai’ysis of operational 
alternatives (AoOA, a subcategory of AoA, the analysis of alternatives of common 
reference). 
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(c. 1) AoOA: Sensitivity to Nomination Rate and Mean Service Time Variations for 
Model I 
Table 1 presents the fraction of targets for which there is a command to FWR as the 
Mean 0.19 
servicethe 0.38 
mE (hs) 0.76 
arrival rate and mean service time varies. The bold entry corresponds to the fraction of targets 
for which there is command FWR for the parameters detennined from FBE F data. The 
alternative arrival rates are 0.5 times and 2 times the base arrival rate of 3.67 targets 
Nomination rate 
A(tgts per hour) 
1.83 3.67 7.36 
0.86 0.79 0.59 
0.69 0.53 0.32 
0.44 0.29 0.16 
nominated per hour. The mean alternative service times are 0.5 times and 2 times the base 
mean service time of 0.38 hours. 
Table 1 
A display of the fraction of targets for which a command of FWR is issued appears as 
Figure 3. 
Fraction of tgts for which a command FWR is issued 
The 36 targets that were not fired upon for reasons other than deficiency in time, 
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Figure 3 
(d) Model I1 
We alternatively assume that the command FWR could be given for 129 targets out of the 
176 targets nominated, but not all the commands are given (delete 36) at/just before the 
command FWR; see Gt pp. 84-85. The fluid model shows that if the mean time between 
target nomination and the command FWR is W =  0.79 hours and 129 commands could be 
given in the 48 hour period, then the mean target loss time, (l/v), is about 3.1 hours and the 
mean service time by the central processor (LAWS and JTW) is about 0.27 hours = 16 
minutes, “on the average”. However, in just the fi-action 93/129=0.72 of these cases the 
command FWR was actually given. 
(d. 1) AoOA: Sensitivity to Nomination Rate and Mean Service Time Variations, 1 
The table below presents the fraction of targets for which there is a command to FWR as 
the arrival rate and mean service time varies. The fi-action is obtained by computing the mean 
number of targets for which the command FWR would have been given during 48 hours from 
11 
the fluid model; multiplying that number by 93/129; and then dividing the result by the mean 
number of targets that would be nominated in 48 hours. The bold entry corresponds to the 
fiaction of targets for which there is command FWR for the parameters determined fiom FBE 
F data. The arrival rates are 0.5 times and 2 times the base arrival rate of 3.67 targets 
nominated per hour. The mean service times are 0.5 times and 2 times the base mean service 
time of 0.27 hours. 
Fraction of Targets for which there is a Command Fire When Ready 
I I I I service time I 0.27 I 0.62 I 0.53 I 0.33 I 
I mE (bs) 1 0.54 I 0.47 I 0.31 I 0.17 I 
Table 2 
A display of the fkaction of targets for which a command of FWR is issued fkom Table 2 
appears as Figure 4. 
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Fraction of targets for which a command RNR is issued. 
The 36 targets that were not fired upon for reasons other than deficiency in time, 
resources, etc remain in the system until command 
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Figure 4 
(e) Model111 
We are assuming that 176-36=140 targets actually enter the CP for processing. This 
results in a constant arrival rate of 140/48=2.92 targets nominated per how for the 48 hour 
period. We are assuming the command FWR is given for 93 targets out of the 140 targets 
nominated. The fluid model shows that if the mean time between target nomination and the 
command FWR is W =  0.79 hours and 93 commands could be given in the 48 hour period, 
then the mean target loss time, (l/v), is about 2.4 hours and the mean service time by the 
central processor (LAWS and JTW) is about 0.35 hours = 21 minutes, “on the average”. Note 
again that this is an unrealistically optimistic case. 
(e. 1) AOOA: Sensitivity to Nomination Rate and Mean Service Time Variations 
The table below presents the ftaction of targets for which there is a command to FWR as 
the arrival rate and mean service time varies. The fraction is obtained by computing the mean 
number of targets for which the command FWR would have been given during 48 hours from 
13 
the fluid model and dividing by the mean number of targets nominated during the 48 hour 
period. The bold entry corresponds to the fiaction of targets for which there is command 
FWR for the parameters determined for the base case parameters. The arrival rates are 0.5 
times and 2 times the base arrival rate of 2.92 targets nominated per hour. The mean service 
times are 0.5 times and 2 times the base mean service time of 0.35 hours. Fraction of targets 
for which there is a command fire when ready. 
Fraction of Targets for which there is a Command Fire When Ready 
~~ 
Nomination rate 
il(tgts per hour) 
1.46 2.92 5.82 
Mean 0.14 0.91 0.88 0.75 
service time 0.27 0.80 0.67 0.43 
mE (hrs) 0.54 0.57 0.39 0.22 
Table 3 
A display of the fi-action of targets for which a command of FWR is issued fi-om Table 3 




























(f) Conclusions for This Example 
A comparison of Tables 1,2, and 3 and Figures 3,4, and 5 displays the effect that the 
presence of the 36 targets which were not fired upon because of reasons other than deficiency 
in time, etc. can have on the performance of the CP. In Model II whose results are displayed 
in Table 2 and Figure 4, these targets remain in the system until the stage in which a 
command FWR would have been given, but are only then removed. In Model I whose results 
are displayed in Table 1 and Figure 3, these targets are subject to a loss mechanism while in 
service and so are removed fiom the system before the command FWR would have been 
given; thus in Model I these targets consume less CP resource. In Model IU these targets are 
removed &om the system at the time they are nominated and so consume no resources. The 
results show that the amount of CP resources that these 36 targets consume has a large effect 
on the ability to fire missions against time critical targets. The fiaction of targets for which a 
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command to FWR is the largest is that for Model III in which the targets consume no CP 
resources. Thus it is important for the CP to identify these targets as early as possible and 
remove them from consideration. 
summary, 
(1) A simple BATLW-style fluid model can be quantitatively/numerically specified 
by using FBE Foxtrot data. Note that point estimates of basic rate parameters 
differ depending on how ineligible targets are treated: as in Model I, if mean CP 
service time is halved, the estimated FWR rate increases from 0.53 to 0.79 (49%), 
while in Model 11 it increases fiom 0.53 to 0.66 (25%). In Model m the removal 
of the ineligible targets before they enter the CP results in greater estimated FWR 
rates than either of the other two models. In Model IU, The fi-action of targets for 
which for the command FWR is 0.67 for the base case as compared to 0.53 for the 
other models. 
(2) The response or MOE (fraction of nominated targets actually targeted) to 
variations in Red challenge (roughly the value of Nomination rate, A) and Blue 
response capability (roughly the value of CP Mean Service Time, llp) can easily 
be calculated, either via formula using a hand-held calculator, or simple Visual 
Basic-Excel programs already available. See Figures 3,4 and 5. 
4. PROPOSED EXTENSIONS AND FURTHER APPLICATIONS 
The above models can be extended in various ways that will support operations analysis 
and system element tradeoffs. 
(a) Exercise the current model for different arrival (here nomination) rates (and especially 
surge patterns, that reach the beginning of the current CP stage), andor with different CP 
mean service times (involving human actions such as mensuration by JTW and weapon- 
target pairing by LAWS). Expand the scope of the present CP stages to include previous and 
subsequent stages ! 
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The analysis and models must be extended to account for the availability of more than 
one/a single CP (JTW-LAWS). One way is to use dynamic sectorization, but there may be 
others, such as dynamic spatial sectorization by Blue weapon platform types (missiles and 
gunnery, vs. manned d c  vs. unmanned dc). Apply to later/future FBE’s data. 
(b) Target images (potential targets) will not be of the same/similar types of platforms or 
other assets; e.g. they will have different mobility characteristics. Confusion / uncertainty 
between target types can realistically occur, and will be modeled; see original BATLW, 
Gaver and Jacobs (2000). It will be useful to extend the present analysis to examine mixtures 
of target types. Implications should motivate more specific observed/operational data 
collection. The effect of decoys is a case in point, especially when there is an assumedknown 
probability of correct classification (probability less than one); it will be desirable to plan to 
gather data that allows estimation of “confusion probabilities”. 
(c) Target images (potential targets) must be prioritized for CP service byperceived type. 
This is an uncertain process that can be analyzed. An objective could be to supply an 
automated decision aid to assist (not replace) human weaponeering. 
(d) Consider, model, and analyze “flat” or “parallel-processing” architectures to replace 
the “vertical Central Processor (CP)” now (2000) in use. This, together with densely spaced 
small/local sensors, can potentially reduce response time and hence potentially greatly 
increase target prosecution rate, and againpotentially increase target kill rate. It is in the spirit 
of Network-Centric Warfare; see Cebrowski and Garstka (1 998), Alberts, Garstka and Stein 
(1998). 
(e) All of the above can be analyzed at higher resolution, and stochastically (as always, 
using some basic assumptions, which it would be desirable to approximately verify fkom real 
data) by using more detailed simulation models such as NSS (Metron) and SEAS 
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APPENDIX A - A CENTRAL-PROCESSOR (C-P) MODEL 
Let 
C(t) = the number of targets waiting for or being served by the Central Proc-s 
N(t) = the number of targek that complete processing during time (O,t] 
Let 
or (CP) 
,UE = the rate of processing time (=l/mE where mE is the mean time to process a 
possible target; it includes target mensuration and weapon assignment) 
vc = loss rate per detected target while being processed to a shooter 
CP se&e rate 
Note that the term c(t) represents the saturability of the central processor: it cannot 
1 + c ( t )  
“work faster” than at rate ,u~; if several parallel facilities were available it would tend to 
behave similarly, but at rate = # of facilities*,uE. See Gaver and Jacobs (2000), which 
describes the BAT/IW model. The term v&(t) represents the rate at which enqueued 
potential targets are lost by the central processor. Such “losses” may occur because (a) some 
targets physically leave the region covered, or hide, or (b) track is lost because of load on the 
processor. 
Little’s formula, C = AV, is used to rewrite equation (A. 1 )  as an equation for the total 
time a target is in Central Processing; cf. Ross (1997). Let W(t) be the time spent waiting and 
being served by targets in the central processor at time t. 
I 
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w( t )=  a(t) -PE n(t)w(t) - vcL(t)W(t) (A.3) 
w 1+n(t)w(t)  Total anival rate 
(with feedback) 
dt 
cp loss rate 
Dividing both sides by A(t), 
CP s-ce rate 
If steady-state or statistical equilibrium is assumed then - dw(t) - 0 (we must assume n(t) = 
dt 
A, a constant). Putting W(t) = Wand setting the LHS equal to 0 results in 
w 
1+nw O = l - p , - -  V C  W (A-4) 
Solving for the service rate pE 
I -1 
This gives a simple estimate of service rate, given W, the mean time that a target (image) 
actually achieves the command Fire When Ready. This answer will typically agree well with 
the time-dependent calculation described earlier (starting with no target images present) if 
traffic is not too heavy. 
Use of such backward inference seems unavoidable, starting fiom the FBE numbers 
available. 
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